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South Camden and Environmental Justice:
Substance, Procedure, and Politics
by Jeffrey M. Gaba
n two recent
styled South
Camden Citizens
in
Action
v. Newdecisions
Jersey Department
ofEnvironmental
Protection,' Judge Stephen M. Orlofsky of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey has seemingly put some
teeth in the environmental justice movement. The judge not
only found that private parties have a cause of action for violation of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA's) Title VI environmental justice regulations, 2 but,
based on the failure of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) to properly consider environmental justice issues, he vacated air quality permits issued by the NJDEP and enjoined
operation of a cement plant
3
in Camden, New Jersey.
Although the finding of a private cause of action is the
most striking aspect of the opinions, there are a number of
other fascinating implications of these decisions. First, in
applying Title VI civil rights legislation to environmental
permitting, the judge apparently applied a new, general environmental standard of "no significant adverse affect" for
permit decisions that disproportionately affect minority
communities. Thus, a new standard may have been added to
the roster of environmental standards and acronyms.
Second, the specific Title VI violation found by the
judge was the failure of the NJDEP to assess disparate environmental impacts of its permitting decision. The opinion, however, nowhere discusses the substantive authority that state permit writers have to either deny or condition environmental permits based on a finding of disparate adverse impact. Based on EPA's positions on its own
permit authority and EPA's Title VI guidance, it is quite
likely that states have minimal legal authority to take
such actions.
Jeffrey Gaba is a Professor of Law at the Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University. He received his M.P.H. at Harvard University in
1989; his J.D. at Columbia University in 1976; and his B.A. from the University of California, Santa Barbara, in 1972. Professor Gaba is also Of
Counsel to the law firm Gardere & Wynne in Dallas, Texas. He can be

reached by e-mail at jgaba@mail.smu.edu.
1. No. 01-702, 2001 WL 392472 (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 2001) (South Camden I); No. 01-702,2001 WL 491965 (D.N.J. May 10, 2001) (South
Camden II).
2. 40 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2000).
3. On June 15, 2001, the Third Circuit lifted the district court's injunction that prohibited operation of the cement plan; the court indicated doubt about the district court's decision that a private cause
of action existed under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act to assert a vio-

lation of Title VI regulations. See LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 20,

2001, at 3. Briefs have been filed and an expedited ruling on the
merits could be issued by late summer. See section entitled The
South Camden Decisions, infra, for a discussion of the district
court's holding.

Even if this is the case, however, the South Camden decisions and EPA's Title VI regulations will still be important
tools in the environmental justice movement. At a minimum, Title VI requirements will require states to use whatever authority they have to minimize environmental impacts of permits creating disparate impacts. Perhaps more
significantly, a Title VI assessment, whether compelled by
private parties through a private cause of action orby EPA
through its Title VI authority, will be an important political tool.
Environmental Justice and Title VI
One of the most interesting developments in environmental
law has been the growing appreciation of the distributional
justice concerns of environmental pollution. Fueled by a series of studies that suggest environmentally harmful activities, such as waste disposal sites or polluting industries, are
disproportionately located in minority communities, 4 civil
rights and environmental justice advocates have increasingly brought attention to the potential discriminatory application of environmental laws. The major, although not exclusive, focus of environmental justice concerns has involved the permitting by state and federal officials of harmful facilities in minority neighborhoods.5
Although the environmental justice movement has focused the attention of the environmental community on a
critical injustice, the movement has been limited by a lack of
legal tools to address the issue.6 Environmental justice
claims based on violation of the Equal Protection Clause
face the almost insurmountable burden of proving discriminatory intent.7 Executive Order No. 12898, issued by
President William J. Clinton, requires federal agencies to
consider environmental justice issues, but the Executive
4. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and DiscriminatorySiting: Risk-Based Representationand Equal Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329 (1995); Vicki Been, What's Fairness
Got to Do With It? EnvironmentalJustice and the Siting of Locally

UndesirableLand Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993).
5. Separate issues have been raised about discriminatory enforcement
of environmental laws. In 1992, the NationalLaw Journal,for example, published the result of its investigation of federal enforcement ofenvironmental law suggesting that the federal government is
less responsive to environmental needs in minority communities.

NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at 52.
6. See generally Karen Smith, How the Legal System Has Failed the
EnvironmentalJustice Movement, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES &ENVTL.
L. 325 (1996-1997).
7. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb
County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir.
1989).
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Order itself creates no private right of action and provides
no new authority8 for agencies to address environmental
justice concerns.
Perhaps the most promising tool for addressing environmental justice concerns has been Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 9 Title VI generally prohibits discrimination by
parties receiving federal funds. Section 601 directly provides that no person shall "on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any activity" covered by Title VI.10
Section 602 authorizes federal agencies to effectuate the
provisions of section 601 "by issuing rules, regulations, or
order of general applicability." u Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a violation of the prohibition in
§601 requires proof of discriminatory intent, 2 the Court's
opinions have generally held that agencies are free to establish Title VI regulations that prohibit activities by recipients
13
of federal funds that have discriminatory effects.
EPA in 1984 issued its Title VI environmental justice rejulations (EPA Title VI regulations) pursuant to §602.
These regulations, found at 40 C.F.R. Part 7, expressly provide that "[n]o person shall be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving EPA assistance on
the basis of race, color, national origin.... ."15 The regulations implement this general prohibition through a test
based on discriminatory impacts. The regulations expressly
provide that a recipient of federal funds are prohibited from:
8. Exec. Order No. 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, 59
Fed. Reg. 762 (Feb. 11, 1994), ADMIN. MAT. 45075. Section 1-1 of
the Executive Order states that agencies are to implement its policies
"to the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law .... Section
6-608 states that the Executive Order is not intended to create any
private rights. See In re Chemical Waste Management of Ind., 6
E.A.D. 66, ADMIN. MAT. 40392 (EPA EAB June 29, 1995) (discussing the legal implications of Exec. Order No. 12898).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§2000d et seq.
10. Id. §2000d.
11. Id §2000d-1.
12. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001); Regents of Univ.

of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
13. See Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. at 1511; Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.

Comm'n of New York City, 43 U.S. 582 (1983).
14. U.S. EPA, Nondiscrimination in Programs Receiving Federal Assistance From the Environmental Protection Agency, 49 Fed. Reg.
1656 (Jan. 12, 1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2000)). In 1998,
EPA issued "interim guidance" on application of these regulations.
U.S. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TrrLE VI
PERMrrS (1998) (available from the ELR Document Service, ELR

Order No. AD-3660). See Maura Lynn Tierney, EnvironmentalJustice and Title VI Challengesto PermitDecisions: The EPA s Interim
Guidance, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 1277 (1999). EPA recently issued
two "draft" guidance documents that further expand on implementation of the Title VI regulations. U.S. EPA, Draft Title VI Guidance
for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering Environmental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft Revised

Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints
Challenging Permits (Draft Revised Investigation Guidance), 65
Fed. Reg. 39650 (June 27,2000) (available from the ELR Document
Service, ELR Order Nos. AD-4517 (Draft Recipient Guidance) and
AD-4516 (Draft Revised Investigation Guidance) [hereinafter Draft
Title VI Guidance]. One document provides guidance to recipients
of federal funds on compliance with their Title VI obligations. The
other provides guidance on EPA's investigation of environmental
justice complaints. See Bradford C. Mank, The DraftTitle VlRecipient and Revised Investigation Guidances: Too Much Discretionfor
EPA and a More Difficult Standardfor Complainants?, 30 ELR
11144 (Dec. 2000).

15. 40 C.F.R. §7.30 (2000).
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[U]sing criteria or methods of administering its program

which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin,
or sex, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program
of a particular race, color, nawith respect to individuals
16
tional origin, or sex.

Upon a finding of a violation of these
17 regulations, EPA may
withdraw funding to the recipient.
One major focus of the environmental justice movement
has been implementation of these requirements by EPA.
EPA has faced a growing number of petitions by private parties seeking to have EPA act against state environmental
agencies receiving EPA funding. These petitions are generally based on claims that the state agencies' activities, particularly permitting decisions, have discriminatory impact.
Additionally, in response to Executive Order No. 12898,
EPA has increasingly addressed, if not acted on, environt9
mental justice concerns in its own permit decisions.
What has been lacking has been a cause of action by citizens groups directly against the allegedly discriminating
state agency or the offending facility. The availability of
such a cause of action was the main focus of the South Camden decisions.
The South Camden Decisions
The South Camden decisions involve a challenge to a decision by the NJDEP to issue air permits to a proposed cement
processing plant to be operated by St. Lawrence Cement Co.
(SLC) in the Waterfront South neighborhood of Camden.
Waterfront South is overwhelmingly a minority community.
Sixty-three percent of the residents are African American,
28% are Hispanic, and 9% are non-Hispanic whites.
Forty-one percent of the residents are children. 20 Although
located in the "Garden State," it is fair to say that Waterfront
South is not a garden spot. It is, as described by the judge, "a
popular spot for locating industrial facilities.",2' The neighborhood, prior to the proposed operation of the cement refinery, already contained a large number of waste disposal
and recycling facilities, a sewage2 treatment plant, a power
plant, and two Superfund sites.
The proposed cement facility would contribute to existing pollution in the neighborhood. The facility itself would
directly emit particulates, mercury, lead, manganese, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, and volatile organic compounds. It would also indirectly increase the pollution burden in the area from trucks serving the facility. The
opinion states that, annually, there would be 35,000 inbound
16. Id. §7.35(b).
17. Id. §7.130.
18. One commentator has noted that as of 1999, EPA had received 67 administrative complaints claiming disparate environmental impacts
under Title VI. David D. Duncan, Environmental Justice and Permitting: Cases Applying EPA 's Guidance and Regulations,ENVrL.
REG. & PERMrrNG, Summer 1999, at 105, 108. As of June 1, 2001,
the website for EPA's Office of Environmental Justice lists far more
than that number. See U.S. EPA, Title VI Complaints, at
http://www.epa.gov/ocrpagel/t6complnt.htm (last visited June 1,
2001).
19. See Duncan, supra note 18.
20. South Camden I, No. 01-702, 2001 WL 392472, slip op. at 10.
21. Id at 1.
22. Id
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truck deliveries to the facility
23 and 42,000 outbound truck deliveries from the facility.
Although health and environmentaljustice concerns were
raised during the permit process, the NJDEP's general position was that its actions satisfied environmental justice obligations because the permits would assure compliance with
EPA's health-based national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS). The NJDEP conducted no site-specific health
assessment on the impact of the proposed facility. 24
In South Camden I, the judge held, based on prior Third
Circuit cases, that citizens had a direct cause of action under
§602 of Title VI to sue the state for violating EPA's Title VI
regulations. Applying a preliminary injunction standard, the
judge also held that the plaintiff had established a likelihood
of success on the merits. In reaching this conclusion, the
judge held that the plaintiffs had met their burden of proving
that the proposed facility would have a disproportionate and
significant "adverse affect" on the community and that this
affect was "caused" by the criteria. Although SLC offered
economic justification for the impact, the court held that
there was insufficient evidence to rebut the existence of the
significant adverse impact.
Five days after the issuance of South Camden I, the
Court issued its opinion in Alexander v. Sandoval.2 5 On a
5-4 vote, the Court in Sandovalheld that there was no private cause of action under Title VI for violation of agency
regulations issued under §602. The Court assumed, but
did not address, the issue of whether agencies had the authority under §602 to promulgate Title VI regulations that
prohibit conduct based on discriminatory "impact" as opposed to "intent."
Not to be outdone (or undone), Judge Orlofsky, in South
Camden II, quickly issued an elaborate and well-reasoned
opinion that held that the plaintiff could rely on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 as an independent cause of action to assert that New
Jersey's practices violated EPA Title VI regulations. Section
1983, among other things, prohibits states "under color of
law" from depriving citizens of rights secured by the "Constitution or laws," and the court concluded that EPA's Title
VI regulations created "a federal right" that could be enforced through a § 1983 action. Allowing an amendment of
the original complaint to allow plaintiffs to plead § 1983, the
court reaffirmed the substantive holdings in South Camden I
regarding violation of the EPA regulations.

23. Id. at 3-5.
24. According to the opinion, the NJDEP considered:
[0] nly whether the facility's emissions would exceed technical emissions standards for specific pollutants, especially
dust. Indeed, much of what this case is about is what the
NJDEP failed to consider. It did not consider the level of
ozone generated by the truck traffic to and from the SLC facility, notwithstanding the fact that the Waterfront South
community is not currently in compliance with [NAAQS] established by EPA for ozone levels, nor did it consider the
presence of many other pollutants in Waterfront South. It did
not consider the pre-existing poor health of the residents of
Waterfront South, nor did it consider the cumulative environmental burden already borne by this impoverished community. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the NJDEP
failed to consider the racial and ethnic composition and population of Waterfront South.
Id. at 2.

25. 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001).
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Some Environmental Implications of South Camden
and Title VI
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the South Camden decisions is the finding of a direct private action against state
practices that violate EPA's Title VI regulations. Although
the direct Title VI cause of action was rejected in Sandoval,
there is considerable support for the district court's conclusion that § 1983 provides an alternative ground for the private cause of action. 26 But even in the absence of a direct private cause of action, EPA's Title VI regulations may continue to be significant since the Court has not disputed the
federal agencies' ability to enforce Title VI regulations
through appropriate mechanisms. 27 Thus, EPA may continue to put pressure on states to comply with the regulations
through threats of funding withdrawal, and private parties
still have the ability to petition EPA to act against states that
are alleged to have violated the regulations.
The application of EPA's Title VI regulations in South
Camden has other perhaps more significant implications for
environmental law.
Does itle VI Create a New Broadly Applicable
Environmental Standardof "No SignificantAdverse
Affects "?
Environmental lawyers are familiar with the variety of environmental standards contained in federal environmental
statutes. The NAAQS in the Clean Air Act (CAA) are set on
a standard of "requisite to protect the public health" with an
"adequate margin of safety." 28 Water quality standards under the Clean Water Act are established to achieve the
fishable/swimmable standard of §101 (a)(3). 29 The general
standard for establishing conditions for hazardous waste
disposal facilities is "necessary to protect public health and
the environment., 30 Some of these standards can form the
basis for direct permit conditions; others are used to establish standards that are then translated into permit restrictions; others are merely hortatory with limited or no legal
significance. One of the most striking aspects of the South
Camden opinions (at least to this environmental lawyer) is
the court's use of Title VI to establish a new, generally applicable, environmental standard of "no significant adverse affect."
In South Camden I, the court evaluated compliance with
EPA's Title VI regulations based on an assessment of
whether the permit would have a "disparate impact" on a
minority population. Based on case law interpreting "disparate impact" in other contexts, the court held that plaintiffs
must establish that a facially neutral practice "detrimentally
affects persons of a particular race to a greater extent than
other races." 31 Applying this standard, the court in South
Camden held that plaintiffs could likely prevail on a claim
26. See id at 1527 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27. It remains to be seen whether the Court will continue its current position that federal agencies may adopt "disparate impact" regulations
under §602 to implement a "discriminatory intent" standard under
§601.
28. 42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(1), ELR STAT. CAA §109(b)(1).

29. See 40 C.F.R. §131.10 (2000).
30. 42 U.S.C. §6923(a), ELR STAT. RCRA §3003(a) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)).
31. South Camden I, No. 01-702, 2001 WL 392472, slip op. at 34.
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that the state had violated EPA's Title VI regulations based
on an unrebutted showing that plaintiffs would suffer disproportionate significant "adverse affects" that were
"caused" by the NJDEP's permitting practices.
The court quite properly concluded that the mere assurance that the source would not violate national health-based
air standards would not assure the absence of local adverse
health effects. Anyone familiar with the methodology and
scope of NAAQS knows that this is self-evident. Thus, the
court found that the NJDEP had erred by not conducting a
site-specific assessment of the extent to which the residents
of Waterfront South would be "adversely affected" by permitting the proposed facility.
What is remarkable is the source and scope of this requirement to assess localized adverse affects. The court did
not conclude that the CAA required a site-specific assessment of air quality; nor did it conclude that the appropriate
standard for assessing localized air quality impacts was any
standard found in the CAA or other environmental statute.
Rather, the court held that New Jersey would likely be found
in violation of a Title VI regulatory standard of significant
"adverse affects." Thus, the Title VI "disparate impact"
analysis became the standard for assessing environmental
adequacy of the state's permitting actions.
Application of such a Title VI "no significant adverse affect" standard could have broad applicability. Nothing in the
court's analysis nor in EPA's Title VI regulations, for example, limit the application of the "no significant adverse affect" standard to consideration of the types of affects regulated by the funded agency.32 In South Camden I, the main
focus was the air quality impacts associated with the issuance of air permits, but presumably all environmental impacts could be considered whether or not related to the jurisdiction of the funded agency. Thus, if a state agency receiving EPA funding issues an air quality permit, the water
quality impacts of the proposed facility would now be subject to the Title VI standard. Once there is a federal funding
handle through EPA's grant program, any state permit will
presumably be potentially subject to the broad-ranging Title VI standard.
Nor is it clear that the application of EPA's Title VI regulations is limited to consideration of the types of environmental impacts that are generally regulated by EPA. If aesthetic or recreational loss is viewed as a "significant adverse
affect," permits issued by state agencies receiving EPA
funds would presumably be subject to a Title VI review for
such impacts. Plaintiffs in South Camden, in fact, claimed
that the permitting of the proposed cement plant would adversely affect their "quality of life." The court rejected
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on this claim,
not because such an affect would not be covered by EPA's
Title VI regulations, but because the claim was unsupported
by the record.33 Similar "quality of life" concerns also

formed the basis of a claimed violation of EPA's Title VI
regulations in New York City Environmental Justice Alli32. EPA's Title VI regulations prohibit fund recipients from engaging in
practices that subject "individuals to discrimination" or "have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the
objectives of the program .... 40 C.F.R. §7.35(b). Thus, it appears
there could be a violation of EPA's Title VI regulations for discriminatory impacts unrelated to the particular EPA funding program.

Once there is a federal funding handle through EPA's grant program,
any state permit will presumably be subject to this Title VI standard.
33. South Camden 1, No. 01-702, 2001 WL 392472, slip op. at 36.
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ance v. Giuliani.34 In Giuliani, plaintiffs argued that New
York City's proposed sale or destruction of city lots containing community gardens would violate EPA's Title VI regulations. The opinion did not identify the nature of EPA's
funding that related to the city's sale of city property, but
EPA's regulations are open to the construction that regardless of the funding source the recipient may not engage in
practices having discriminatory affects unrelated to the
funding itself.
Finally, actions by states funded by any other federal
agency that has similar Title VI regulations would also now
be subject to a similar environmental review. The reason EPA's
regulations were at issue in South Camden was not because
there were environmental impacts but because the state program was funded by EPA. Environmental impact considerations may now be relevant in any state program receiving
funds from federal agencies with similar regulations.
Thus, under the court's analysis, EPA's Title VI regulations (and potentially other federal regulations) allow the
court to undertake a wide-ranging inquiry into the environmental impacts of a proposed facility untethered to any statutory environmental standard.
Does Title VI GrantNew Substantive Authority to Deny or
Condition PrivatePermits?
Although the South Camden opinions are surprisingly circumspect on this issue, it appears that the state's Title VI
failure was its decision not to undertake any additional assessment after finding compliance with the federal
NAAQS. Thus, it was the "criteria or methods" that violated
the regulations. The court's remedy was to enjoin the proposed facility from operating "until the NJDEP performs an
appropriate adverse disparate impact analysis in compliance with Title VI."'35 The court said nothing about what is to
happen after the NJDEP performs such an analysis. Assuming that a properly performed analysis identifies disparate impacts, the court failed to consider whether the state
could deny the permit or impose enforceable conditions beyond those authorized by existing environmental statutes.
This raises the question of whether Title VI itself provides
substantive legal authority to prevent those impacts. Although never discussed by the court in South Camden, EPA
has taken the position that EPA itself has no authority to prevent or mitigate environmental justice concerns other than
the authority found in its environmental statutes. In In re
Chemical Waste Management ofIndiana,Inc.,36 EPA's Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) held, in the context of
the permitting of a hazardous waste facility under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), that the
Agency could incorporate environmental justice concerns
only within the limits of its statutory authority under
RCRA.37 The EAB, however, identified two areas under
34.
35.
36.
37.

214 F.3d 65, 30 ELR 20703 (2d Cir. 2000).
South Camden I, No. 01-702, 2001 WL 392472, slip op. at 53.
6 E.A.D. 66, ADMIN. MAT. 40392 (EPA EAB June 29, 1995).
The EAB stated that:

[1]f a permit applicant meets the requirements of RCRA and
its implementing regulations, the Agency must issue the permit, regardless of the racial or socio-economic composition
of the surrounding community and regardless of the economic effect of the facility on the surrounding community.
6 E.A.D. at 73, ADMIN. MAT. at 40394 (emphasis in original).
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RCRA in which EPA had significant discretion to address
environmental justice issues. These included expanded public participation and the "omnibus" authority in §3005(c) of
RCRA that allows EPA to impose permit conditions "necessary to protect human health and the environment." Beyond that, EPA had no authority under RCRA to deny or
condition permits because of discriminatory impacts. 38 Subsequent decisions of the EAB have affirmed this limitation
on EPA's authority substantively to address environmental
justice concerns.%
These EAB decisions do not involve a consideration of
EPA's authority under Title VI; §602 and EPA's implementing regulations do not apply to EPA. Rather, the EAB opinions have largely focused on an analysis of EPA's authority
substantively to address environmental justice concerns
under Executive Order No. 12898. But it is unlikely that
Title VI or EPA's Title VI regulations grant states greater
authority to address environmental justice concerns than
EPA has itself.
EPA's DraftTitle VI Guidancelargely ignores the issue
of authority substantively to address disparate impacts. 40
The guidance encourages fund recipients to reduce or
eliminate disparate adverse impacts and suggests a variety of possible remedial actions. The guidance is silent,
however, on the source of such authority simply stating
that EPA "expects that remedial measures that reduce or
eliminate alleged disparate impacts will be an important
focus of the informal resolutionprocess.",41 EPA's earlier
Interim Guidancefor Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (Interim Guidance), issued in 1998, stated that the Interim Guidance
did not alter the substantive authority possessed by
funded agencies. 42
In the absence of authority under Title VI, the extent of a
state agency's ability to either deny or condition a state-issued permit based on environmental justice concerns is
likely to turn on the particular authority granted by other
38. In discussing the scope of authority provided by the "omnibus" authority in RCRA, the EAB stated:
[Iln response to an environmental justice claim, the Region
would be limited to ensuring the protection of the health or
environment of the minority or low-income populations. The

Region would not have discretion to redress impacts that are
unrelated or only tenuously related to human health and the
environment, such as disproportionate impacts on the eco-

nomic well-being of a minority or low-income community.
6 E.A.D. at 75, ADMIN. MAT. at 40394 (internal footnote omitted).
39. See, e.g., In re Envotech, L.P., 6 E.A.D. 260, ADMIN. MAT. 40454
(EPA EAB Feb. 15, 1996); In re EcoEldctrica, L.P., 7 E.A.D. 56,
ADMIN. MAT. 40632 (EPA EAB Apr. 8, 1997).
40. See supra note 14.

41. Draft Title VI Guidance, supranote 14, at 39662 (emphasis added).
42. EPA's Office of Civil Rights, however, apparently has taken the po-

sition that state permitting decisions that result in a "discriminatory
effect" violate EPA's Title VI regulations even if the permitting authority does not have the substantive legal authority to deny or condi-

tion the permits based on the discriminatory impacts. See U.S. EPA
OCR Investigative Report for the Title VI Administrative Complaint

File No. 5R-98-R5 (Aug. 17, 1998) (the Select Steel report) (cited in
South Camden I, No. 01-702,2001 WL 392472, slip op. at 28 (D.N.J.
Apr. 19, 2001)). One article describes EPA's 1998 InterimGuidance

as stating that EPA's Office of Civil Rights "will consider discriminatory impacts regardless of whether the permitting agencies are
themselves independently authorized to guard against such impacts ... "Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, IntegratingEnvironmental Justice Into EPA PermittingAuthority, 26 EcOLoGY L.Q.
617, 627 (1999).
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federal or state laws.43 Even with omnibus authority to protect human health and the environment, it is not clear that
states could impose permit conditions (or deny a permit) because minorities were subjected to disproportionate levels
of pollution if the emission limits otherwise satisfied the environmental criteria.
The court's failure to consider the state's ability substantively to address the environmental justice issues is perhaps
the most unsatisfying part of the South Camden decisions.
Certainly such an analysis seems relevant to the issue of
"causation"-are the state's permitting practices "causally"
linked to the disparate impact? It is certainly clear, as the
court noted, that the disparate impacts in the community
would not arise "but for" the NJDEP permit. It may also be
the case that facility-siting decisions are in fact discriminatory. It is less clear that the NJDEP had the authority to prevent those impacts by denying or conditioning the permit.
Is Title VI a PoliticalRather Than a Legal Toolfor
EnvironmentalJustice?
To the extent that it forces permitting authorities to assess
and document disparate adverse impacts, EPA's Title VI
regulations will likely have three significant effects. First, if
an assessment indicates disparate impacts, states may be in
violation if they have not taken all available means to minimize this impact. This will, however, focus on the state's legal authorities under other statutes.
Second, identification of potential environmental concerns is likely to result in increased opportunities for public
participation in the permit process. Whatever limits there
are regarding the states' ability to impose substantive permit
limitations, there should be little issue that states can provide broader opportunities for public participation in appropriate cases. EPA's Draft Recipient Guidance encourages
"meaningful public participation and outreach.""
Third, and perhaps more importantly, Title VI may force
the public airing and recognition of disparate impacts and
environmental injustice. The remedy following such a
showing is likely to be more political than legal.45 Information has its own power, and political pressure will almost
certainly follow from state documentation of impacts. Voluntary acceptance by the permittee of restrictions to minimize impacts is likely.4 Additionally, "voluntary" abandonment ofproposed facilities by the applicant in the face of
local opposition is also possible.47 Information produced by
Title VI analysis may also form the impetus for subsequent
changes to law to allow greater restrictions on facilities producing disparate impact. All in the environmental commu43. See Lazarus & Tai, supra note 42 (interesting evaluation of sources
of authority in federal environmental laws to address environmental
justice concerns).
44. See Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 14, at 39658.
45. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between EnvironmentalLaws and "Justice," 47 AM. U. L. REv. 221
(1997) (discussing the role of environmental justice claims in
achieving "political justice").
46. In South Camden 1,the court mentions that the owners of the proposed cement facility had agreed to alter truck routes to minimize the
impacts on the community.
47. One of the most public battles over environmental justice involved
the siting of the proposed Shintech plastics facility in a predominately minority community in Louisiana. The company ultimately
abandoned their attempts to have the facility permitted in that area.
See Mank, supra note 14, at 11150.
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nity are aware of the power of public information. 48 Thus,
the ultimate effect of the application of EPA's Title VI regulations (either through a private cause of action or through
EPA decisions) may be more political than legal.
Conclusion
The South Camden opinions raise important civil rights issues regarding the availability of a private cause of action
48. The public disclosure of toxic release information under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C.
§11023, ELR STAT. EPCRA §313, has produced powerful political

pressures to reduce emissions. The environmental impact statement
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§4332, ELR STAT. NEPA § 102, although construed by the Court as
essentially a procedural statute requiring documentation and disclosure of significant adverse environmental impacts, is still a powerful
environmental tool.

9-2001

for violation of Title VI regulations. For the environmental
community, the opinions also have interesting implications
for the environmental standards to be used in judging a Title
VI "disparate impact" claim. The opinions are far less satisfactory in assessing the substantive effects of EPA's Title VI
regulations on state permit decisions. Indeed, the opinions
deal more with assessing rather than addressingenvironmental justice concerns.
It would, however, be a mistake to underestimate the
potential impact of a broad Title VI requirement to assess
the site-specific environmental impacts of proposed facilities on minority communities. Not only will such an
assessment form the basis for an expansive use of existing environmental authority, but it will also provide the
political power of voice and visibility to environmental
justice issues.

